

Marc Hecker & Élie Tenenbaum


LA GUERRE DE VINGT ANS

Djihadisme et contre-terrorisme
au XXI^e siècle

**PRIX DU LIVRE
DE GÉOPOLITIQUE
2021**


Robert Laffont

LES ANNEES 2000: HYPERTERRORISME & COIN



<http://www.cartooningforpeace.org>

I/ UN CYCLE TERRORISME/GWOT




BY ROB ROGERS FOR ANDREWS MCMEEL SYNDICATION


La faillite du
renseignement
(National Security
Intelligence)

Le complot

**LA MENACE ET
LE RISQUE**



Views of Terrorism as the Most Important U.S. Problem Since October 2001



GALLUP

Nous sommes tous Américains

DANS CE MOMENT tragique où les mots paraissent si pauvres pour dire le choc que l'on ressent, la première chose qui vient à l'esprit est celle-ci : nous sommes tous



Américains ! Nous sommes tous New-Yorkais, aussi sûrement que John Kennedy se déclarait, en 1962 à Berlin, Berlinois.

ÉDITORIAL
Comment ne pas se sentir en effet, comme dans les moments les plus graves de notre histoire, profondément solidaires de ce peuple et de ce pays, les Etats-Unis, dont nous sommes si proches et à qui nous devons la liberté, et donc notre solidarité.

Comment ne pas être en même temps aussitôt assaillis par ce constat : le siècle nouveau est avancé.

J.-M. C.

Lire la suite page 18

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG
ET LA FONDATION
POUR LA RECHERCHE STRATÉGIQUE

Hyperterrorisme : la nouvelle guerre




Countries designated state sponsors of terrorism

State Sponsors of Terrorism


Country	Designation Date
Cuba	March 1, 1982
Iran	January 19, 1984
Sudan	August 12, 1993
Syria	December 29, 1979

Eight countries have been named state sponsors of terror since the list began in 1979. Currently, four countries are on the list, but the Obama administration has informed Congress that it will remove Cuba.




Source: Congressional Research Service

[After 65 Months, Trump Administration Returns Cuba To List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism January 11, 2021](#)



https://resolvenet.org/index.php/system/files/2019-07/RSVE_RVESeries_ResearchingViolentExtremism-TheStateofPlay_JMBerger_June2019.pdf


How the area under IS control has shrunk





Source: Conflict Monitor by IHS Markit




ISIS Attacks, September 2021



FLASHPOINT



Liberation



**CARNAGES
A PARIS**

Sept attentats lancés à Paris et aux abords du Stade de France ont fait au moins 130 morts. Une vague d'attentats sans précédent.

L'EQUIPE

L'HORREUR

Des attentats meurtriers ont eu lieu aux abords du Stade de France, à Saint-Denis, et à Paris, hier. À minuit et demi, le bilan s'élevait à au moins 40 morts.

Aujourd'hui

**Massacre
terroriste
en plein Paris**



L'Ardennais

Carnages en plein Paris



LE FIGARO

**La guerre
en plein Paris**



LA VOIX DU NORD

**L'HORREUR
À PARIS**

Au moins quarante morts
Française Hollande déclare
l'état d'urgence en France

nice-matin

L'horreur




75 Le Parisien

**Cette fois,
c'est la guerre**




Selon l'organisation responsable



Le groupe le plus meurtrier est **l'organisation Etat islamique**.


Les actions terroristes de ses différentes branches ont provoqué la mort de plus de **52 000** personnes, devant les **talibans** avec plus de **45 000** morts et de **Boko Haram** avec plus de **23 000** morts.

Selon le pays dans lequel l'attentat a été commis



Entre 2000 et janvier 2020, les attentats islamistes ont fait plus de 48 800 victimes en **Afghanistan**, le pays le plus touché, devant **l'Irak** (plus de 40 600 victimes) et le **Nigeria** (plus de 19 300 victimes).

Selon le type d'attaques perpétrées




11-Septembre 2001-2021 : deux décennies dans le « brouillard de la guerre »

Par Rémy Ourdan
Le Monde 10 sept 2021

Les attentats-suicides atteignent leur paroxysme avec l'apogée de l'organisation Etat islamique

Evolution du nombre d'attentats suicides, par année




Sources : Global Terrorism Database ; Fondation pour l'innovation politique

Cartographie Le Monde : Flavie Holzinger et Riccardo Pravettoni

Entre 2000 et janvier 2020, les attaques-suicides représentent un tiers des attaques terroristes


Attacks and deaths from terrorism by region, 2002–2019



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations


The spread of Salafi-jihadist-affiliated violence in Africa

Spatial distribution of conflict events involving jihadist-affiliated groups in Africa, 2000–2020




In extremis

Deaths in terrorist attacks in Western countries*



Sources: University of Maryland START; press reports *Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand, to March 20th 2019





2020 GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM



2020 GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX (GTI)

KEY STATS



Number of deaths from terrorism globally:

13,826

(-15% compared to 2018)



Countries with at least 1 terrorist attack:

68

(lowest since 2013)



Global economic impact of terrorism:

US\$26.4 billion

(-25% compared to 2018)

Source: IEP




X and why

United States, mass shootings*, 1982-2019

Number of fatalities

■ Individual incident


■ Incident with more than ten fatalities



Sources: Mother Jones; press reports

*Shootings with three or more fatalities excluding perpetrator(s). Before January 2013, with four or more fatalities. Not comprehensive †At August 7th

U.S. drug overdose deaths per year



Provisional data for 2020 and 12 months ending in April 2021.


Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics

DAN KEATING / THE WASHINGTON POST

Where overdose death rates are the highest

Latest state drug overdose death rates


For every 100,000 people, rates range from 9 deaths per year in South Dakota to 90 in West Virginia. The District has the second highest rate at 70.



Overdose death rate per 100,000 people in the latest 12 months of provisional data. Rank of 50 states and DC.


Intentional homicides per 100,000 population

25 most populous countries in blue




National Murder Rates, 1960-2020

THE TRACE




Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program



The Cost of the War on Terror

Estimated financial and human costs of the U.S. 'War on Terror' since the 9/11 attacks



507,236

Deaths caused directly
by the War on Terror*

\$5,933b

U.S. war and war-related spending
and obligations through FY2019



@StatistaCharts

* Upper estimate related to the post-9/11 war violence
in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq as of October 2018.
Lower estimate is 479,858.

Source: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs

statista

The Statistics Portal
www.statista.com

The Ivy League university's Cost of War Project calculates that Washington will spend approximately \$5.9 trillion between FY2001-FY2019, a pot of money that includes over \$2 trillion in overseas contingency operations, \$924 billion in homeland security spending, and \$353 billion in medical and disability care for U.S. troops serving in overseas conflict zones. Add the cost of interest to borrowed money into the equation, and the American people will be paying back the debt for decades to come.

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/war-terrors-total-cost-5900000000000-41307>

David Rigoulet-Roze, « Le coût économique du terrorisme : l'équation impossible ? », *Géoéconomie* 2016/3 (N° 80), p. 58-83.


HOW TERRORISM ENDS

UNDERSTANDING THE DECLINE AND DEMISE OF TERRORIST CAMPAIGNS


AUDREY KURTH CRONIN

FIGURE 25 HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END, 268 TERRORIST GROUPS (1968-2006)

Political engagement and policing were the most successful strategies in combating terrorist groups in the long run.



Source: RAND



WHEN DOES TERRORISM WORK?

Edited by
Diego Muro



Tactiquement utile sur le court-terme, mais pas effectif pour objectifs stratégiques

5-10% des groupes l'ayant utilisé on obtenu buts politiques (25% insurrection, 50% non violence)

II/ POURQUOI LA GUERRE EN IRAK EN 2003 / « WAR OF CHOICE/NECESSITY

- 1/ Complot & opportunité: SH (finir le job de 1991), le pétrole, les néo-cons (+ Ahmed Chalabi) Israël, Rumsfeld pour une armée plus musclée et agile (euphorie après victoire en Afgh, à l'inverse des Soviétiques, discours sur L'EMPIRE et le global cop/bad guys, permet encore plus d'unilatéralisme, commencé dès 2000)
- 2/ **Le traumatisme du 11 septembre: peur de connaître pire** (terrorisme nucléaire), **obsession de la sécurité absolue + remasculinisation**, restaurer la puissance US par la guerre (jusqu'à Teheran?) + **modèle Truman 1947** voit la menace globale et y fait face. Le pb ce ne sont plus les CAPACITES, mais les **INTENTIONS** (PREVENTIF)
- 3/ **Can-do mentality** refaire le MO, expansion de la démocratie et éradication moins du terrorisme que des racines du militarisme (comme en 1945), donc du « **regime change** » (qui fait l'objet d'un consensus) Fukuyama + « paix démocratique » + Fouad Ajami (et ds une moindre mesure Bernard Lewis), attente de démocratie mais autocraties à renverser.

Aussi dimension « **civilisationnelle** » (notamment avec Blair depuis 1999 Kosovo, diplo éthique + nouvelle stature internationale « I Will Be With You »), « **guerre juste** » contre des « rogue », qui devient l' « Axe du Mal » janvier 2002 (« Beyond the War on Terror ») + **Dimension religieuse** (God/liberty)

. 4/ Personnalité de Bush (Robert DRAPER), Cheney et son quasi 2^e gvt, batailles internes (mais l'approche Powell-Blair ou même Bush-Baker-Scowcroft part des mêmes constats/Irak) ou **groupthink?** Echec ou politisation du renseignement? WHAT IF Al Gore avait élu en 2000

Were 1998 Memos a Blueprint for War?

By

ABC News

6 January 2006, 18:41

• 5 min read


March 10, 2003 -- Years before George W. Bush entered the White House, and years before the Sept. 11 attacks set the direction of his presidency, a group of influential neo-conservatives hatched a plan to get Saddam Hussein out of power.

The group, the Project for the New American Century, or PNAC, was founded in 1997. Among its supporters were three Republican former officials who were sitting out the Democratic presidency of Bill Clinton: Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz

In open letters to Clinton and GOP congressional leaders the next year, the group called for "the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power" and a shift toward a more assertive U.S. policy in the Middle East, including the use of force if necessary to unseat Saddam.




And in a report just before the 2000 election that would bring Bush to power, the group predicted that the shift would come about slowly, unless there were "some catastrophic and catalyzing event, like a new Pearl Harbor."

Pierre Bourgois, « Un courant singulier au sein du conservatisme états-unien ? », *L'Ordinaire des Amériques* [En ligne], 226 | 2021



Pub Date: Sept. 1, 2000

Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997),





9/11/2001

**Pénétration /viol de l'espace aérien US
Castration (Twin Towers = symboles
phalliques)**



**« Homeland » terme à connotation féminine
Bref, il faut une rémasculiniser l'Amérique :
guerre en Irak**



Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus: they agree on little and understand each other less and less.

(Robert Kagan)


izquotes.com



Spiegel 2002-02-18
"The Bush Warriors – America's Crusade Against Evil"



Spiegel 2008-10-27
"The Bush Warriors – End of the Performance"



L'Amérique est-elle devenue un empire ? La multiplication des ouvrages sur l'"empire américain", les échanges entre auteurs sur la Toile pour discuter de la pertinence de cette caractérisation, le lancement de recherches universitaires sur le sujet montrent que le thème est à la mode

Ferguson enseignera à Harvard en 2004-2005. Dans un discours prononcé dans cette prestigieuse université, le 8 juin 2004 il regrette que l'Amérique ressemble de plus en plus à la Grande-Bretagne, et que la Grande-Bretagne soit de plus en plus européanisée : *"N'est-ce pas merveilleux ? Vous êtes devenus nous, même si nous avons cessé d'être nous-mêmes."* Notre homme ne pense-t-il pas pouvoir contribuer à faire des élites américaines une caste impériale consciente de sa mission, comme le fut l'élite britannique, désormais affadie par son entrée dans le marais européen ? Ses digressions sur l'obésité comme signe de décadence ont pu agacer d'éminents historiens [Kennedy, 2004 ; Gaddis, 2004]. Mais certains chantres de l'impérialisme américain se sont efforcés de le rassurer sur la qualité de la race américaine. Pour Victor Davis Hanson, *"notre population peut paraître molle et avachie sur les campus d'université et les think tanks, mais le genre d'Américains que je vois ici, dans la Californie centrale rurale, aime se battre, travailler jusqu'à l'épuisement et, pour la plupart, s'inquiète plus de ce que nous allons faire à nos ennemis au Moyen-Orient que de ce que ceux-ci pourraient nous faire"*

- **L'empire à la mode Ferguson**

- [Pierre Grosser](#) Dans [L'Économie politique 2004/4 \(n° 24\)](#), pages 106 à 112

THE REGIME CHANGE CONSENSUS


IRAQ IN AMERICAN POLITICS
1990-2003

JOSEPH STIEB



LOSING THE LONG GAME

THE FALSE PROMISE OF
REGIME CHANGE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST



Karine Prémont, Charles-Philippe David & Vincent Boucher (2018)
The Clash of Historical Analogies and Their Influence on Decision-Making: The Case of Iraqi Reconstruction Under George W. Bush, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 29:2, 298-327,

BLAIR'S JUST WAR

IRAQ & THE ILLUSION
OF MORALITY




Peter Lee



These fears persisted, an important point that Draper elides as he progresses in his narrative. They continued because terrorist attacks did not cease after 9/11. Readers are not told of the more than 700 people who were killed by terrorists during 2002, including 30 U.S. citizens. Draper does not discuss Richard Reid's attempt to use a bomb in his shoe to bring down an American Airlines flight in December 2001, or the beheading of the journalist Daniel Pearl in early 2002, or the assault on a synagogue in Tunisia in April 2002, or the arrest of five Yemeni Americans near Buffalo in September 2002 for their links to al Qaeda, or the bombing of nightclubs in Bali in October 2002 that killed more than 200 people, or the murder of the American diplomat Laurence Foley in Jordan also in October 2002, or the scores of suicide attacks in Israel in 2001 and 2002. (M. Leffler)




In their memoirs, almost all of the administration's top officials—Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice, Tenet—emphasize that they went to war for reasons of security, for fear of another terrorist attack, this one conducted with 9/11. Draper dismisses these fears and insists that Bush and his advisers invaded Iraq to promote freedom.



<http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ISSF/PDF/RE11.pdf>

Perspectives on Politics / Volume 11 / Issue 02 / June 2013,



argues that international context would have been fundamentally the same for Gore as it was for Bush: international support for inspections, Saddam's refusal to permit meaningful inspection, intelligence warning that he had, or was about to possess, weapons of mass destruction, and domestic pressures not to take security threats lightly in the aftermath of 9/11. Once Gore started down this road, pressures would have built on him to continue down it, and by the time the point of no return was reached, he would, more likely than not, have opted for war.


neoconism, whose central tenet is that a Bush administration dominated by powerful neoconservatives was a *necessary* condition for the Iraq War



"Brisk, sweeping, and utterly persuasive." **ANDREW BACEVICH**, author of *The Age of Illusions: How America Squandered Its Cold War Victory*

THE UNITED STATES OF WAR

DAVID VINE



A GLOBAL HISTORY OF AMERICA'S
ENDLESS CONFLICTS, FROM
COLUMBUS TO THE ISLAMIC STATE

"An unparalleled historical tour de force."
—Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)

AMERICA'S WAR FOR THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST

A MILITARY HISTORY

National
Book Award
longlist



ANDREW J. BACEVICH

New York Times bestselling author of *Breach of Trust* and *The Limits of Power*

THE AMERICAN EMPIRE PROJECT

EMPIRE'S WORKSHOP

"Grandin has always been a brilliant historian; now he uses his detective skills in a book that is absolutely crucial to understanding our present."
—Naomi Klein, author of *The Shock Doctrine*



LATIN
AMERICA,
THE
UNITED STATES,
AND THE
RISE OF THE
NEW IMPERIALISM

WITH A NEW AFTERWORD ON THE OBAMA DOCTRINE

AUTHOR OF *FORDLANDIA*

GREG GRANDIN

III/ Le MOMENT COIN AUX ETATS-UNIS



COIN's Funeral





How the United States and NATO came to pursue the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan -- and why it might never be used again.

By [Whitney Kassel](#) | Foreign Policy, April 24, 2014,

America Still Needs Counterinsurgency
The "Forever Wars" Are Ending, But the Fight Against
Terrorists and Guerrillas Will Go On

By [Max Boot](#)


Foreign Affairs, June 2, 2021








Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics

= Significant Delay

- Population/Popular Support
- Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
- Government
- Afghanistan Security Forces
- Insurgents
- Crime and Narcotics
- Coalition Forces & Actions
- Physical Environment









WORKING DRAFT - V3




L' «oubli» de la COIN aux Etats-Unis?

- Retour à la guerre classique, à la manœuvre offensive et victorieuse: la victoire israélienne lors de la Guerre des Six Jours (1967), « redécouverte » de la tradition stratégique allemande
- Discours de la « Révolution des Affaires Militaires », depuis les années 1980s jusqu'aux années 2000: le primat de la technologie.
- Leçons du Vietnam, mais aussi du Liban (1983), puis de la Somalie (1992) Doctrine Weinberger (1984) / Powell (1992). Usage de la force avec des objectifs clairs, pour gagner complètement et rapidement (« Decisive Force »).
- Préparation de la guerre conventionnelle en Europe face au Pacte de Varsovie... en définitive menée dans le désert irakien en 1991



From 1979 until 1992, the United States government intervened in the Salvadoran Civil War to defeat ‘communist revolution,’ establish a moderate, centrist government, and prevent its overthrow. One of the primary means to accomplish **American goals in El Salvador rested on a thorough application of counter-insurgency.** In particular, American and Salvadoran strategists used civic action programmes to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of Salvadorans and gain their allegiance. In 1983, whilst the war was at its zenith, the Salvadoran military launched an important counter-insurgency effort that attempted to reverse the government’s fortunes. Unfortunately, these plans failed to affect decisively the outcome of the conflict. Regardless, given their failure in the largest American intervention in the post-Vietnam era, they continue to remain a fundamental aspect of American counter-insurgency doctrine.






Brian D’Haeseleer (2015) American Civic Action: The National Campaign Plan and the Failure to Win ‘Hearts and Minds’ in El Salvador, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 26:3,494-513,




Well, the oil, the oil spot, if you will, is a, is a term in counterinsurgency literature that connotes a peaceful area, secure area. So what you're trying to do is to always extend that, to push that out.

(David Petraeus)




https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRf3x_o9gQg


Celeste Ward Gventer (2014): Counterinsurgency and its Critics, Journal of Strategic Studies,




<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KVF5eOBZXDg>



Porch also shows that, if taken as a general rule, his fish-in-the-sea metaphor is historically inaccurate. 'Better strategies, leadership, coercion, and contingent circumstances in their variety, not popular support, determined victory in small wars/insurgencies.'



Poutine en Tchétchénie (post 1999),
Mahinda Rajapakse au Sri Lanka (2005-2009)
Bachar El-Assad en Syrie (depuis 2011)
SOLUTION SEULEMENT MILITAIRE, VICTOIRE TOTALE



**Yes, American police act like occupying armies.
They literally studied their tactics**

From the Cold War through today, the U.S. has quietly assisted dozens of regimes around the world in suppressing civil unrest and securing the conditions for the smooth operation of capitalism. Casting a new light on American empire, *Badges Without Borders* shows, for the first time, that the very same people charged with global counterinsurgency also militarized American policing at home.

In this groundbreaking exposé, Stuart Schrader shows how the United States projected imperial power overseas through police training and technical assistance—and how this effort reverberated to shape the policing of city streets at home. Examining diverse records, from recently declassified national security and intelligence materials to police textbooks and professional magazines, Schrader reveals how U.S. police leaders envisioned the beat to be as wide as the globe and worked to put everyday policing at the core of the Cold War project of counterinsurgency. A “smoking gun” book, *Badges without Borders* offers a new account of the War on Crime, “law and order” politics, and global counterinsurgency, revealing the connections between foreign and domestic racial control.